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A number of environmental problems are interna-
tional in nature, including many water management 
issues. Rivers, for example, do not recognize political 
boundaries. Therefore, pollution generated in one 
country can affect neighboring countries, while wa-
ter extraction in an upstream country can affect wa-
ter flow and water availability in a downstream 
country. The situation creates an interdependency 
among countries, which might lead to disputes over 
the management of transboundary water. Therefore, 
coordination among the countries is necessary for 
effective management of these transboundary re-
sources. 
The focus of a recently published study 
(Khachaturyan and Schoengold, 2018) is the trans-
boundary Kura-Araks Basin (see Figure 1 for its lo-
cation), which is a major river system in the South 
Caucasus, with about 11 million people living in the 
basin. The countries in the basin are Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Georgia, Iran, and Turkey, with Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia having over 80 percent of 
the streamflow. The Kura-Araks Basin is a primary 
source of water for agricultural, industrial, and mu-
nicipal uses in the South Caucasian countries. The 
study determines whether there are economic bene-
fits to be gained from cooperation in the manage-
ment of the Kura River (shared between Azerbaijan 
and Georgia), and under what conditions coopera-
tion is an achievable outcome. Azerbaijan withdraws 
about 35 percent of the total available renewable wa-
ter resources while Georgia only withdraws about 3 
percent.  
The development and expansion of irrigated agricul-
ture increased water use in the Kura River Basin of 
Azerbaijan. The reductions of natural flow, caused  
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  10-12-18 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .  *  *  * 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  180.66  169.69  183.35 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  170.20  163.74  164.80 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  197.50  209.13  202.68 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  59.57  45.05  NA 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73.45  66.84  78.02 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  150.49  134.10  137.49 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  389.35  377.15  376.01 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.15  4.63  4.69 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.07  3.31  3.41 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  9.01  7.29  7.67 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5.46  5.13  5.41 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.92  2.93  3.32 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  *  185.00  * 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83.75  102.50  102.50 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  82.50  102.50  87.50 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  117.50  136.50  141.50 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44.00  44.00  48.75 
 ⃰ No Market          
by overuse of some rivers, worsen the conditions in the ba-
sin. In addition to water quantity, water quality is also of 
significant concern in the region. Water quality degrada-
tion occurs from a variety of sources, including municipal 
and industrial wastewater, extensive use of pesticides and 
fertilizers in agriculture, and wastewater from mining activ-
ities. Given the existing challenges for water management 
in the basin, it is important to evaluate the feasibility of co-
operation between the countries to improve outcomes. 
Game theory offers a powerful set of tools that can be used 
to analyze economic and political incentives for coopera-
tion, the strategies of the parties involved, and the possible 
outcomes in various strategic contexts, including trans-
boundary resources. Therefore, it is frequently used to ana-
lyze international agreements. Linking issues can help 
achieve cooperation and build trust, since a country that 
benefits from cheating on one issue may cooperate when 
another country can credibly cheat on another issue in re-
taliation.  
Georgia and Azerbaijan have an upstream-downstream 
relationship. Hence, actions taken by Georgia, the up-
stream riparian, have an effect on Azerbaijan, the down-
stream riparian. However, for cooperation to occur, there 
need to be benefits of cooperation for both countries. To 
design an effective treaty that is relevant to policy-makers 
and negotiators, we need to first identify the strength of 
each player. In the current analysis, the strength for Geor-
gia is defined to be a large amount of water and its up-
stream position (as Azerbaijan is dependent on its up-
stream neighbor for both quality and quality of waters en-
tering its territory), while the strength of Azerbaijan is 
greater economic resources and large amounts of oil and 
natural gas resources. The analysis will consider water 
quantity and water quality, as both are critical issues in the 
region.  
Isolated Negotiations: Water Quantity  
As the upstream riparian, Georgia is well-
positioned to provide more water to Azerbaijan. 
While its total and per-capita water withdrawals are 
lower than Azerbaijan, it has almost twice the esti-
mated renewable water available. More water will 
allow Azerbaijan to expand both its agriculture and 
industry sectors, and will allow some diversification 
beyond the energy industry. Given Azerbaijan’s 
downstream position and dependency on Georgia 
to receive a continuous and sufficient flow of water, 
Azerbaijan needs to offer something attractive to 
Georgia in return for such flow. With more eco-
nomic resources due to its status as an energy ex-
porter, Azerbaijan has the economic resources to 
provide better irrigation technology that can in-
crease water use efficiency in Georgia. Due to the 
higher cost of drip irrigation, we focus on a switch 
from flood to sprinkler irrigation, which has an av-
erage efficiency improvement of 20 percent. 
Azerbaijan has two strategies to provide efficient water 
use technology (e.g., drip irrigation) to save water or 
not: technology or no technology. Providing technolo-
gy means providing financial and technical assistance 
in order to increase the efficiency of water use in Geor-
gia. Georgia has two strategies: more water or less wa-
ter. An agreement between the two countries will specify 
the technology investment supplied by Azerbaijan and 
the amount of water supplied by Georgia.  
The payoffs associated with this agreement are in Table 
1. Each cell has two values, the first corresponding to 
Azerbaijan’s payoff and the second to Georgia’s payoff. 
The cell with strategies no technology and less water is 
the status quo situation. The payoff (0, 0) is used for the 
status quo to provide a baseline for comparison with 
alternative agreements. Technology and more water is 
the cooperative outcome with an associated payoff of 
(15.22, 1.04) (payoffs are measured in billions of dol-
lars). However, strategies no technology and less water 
is the predicted outcome, since each country has an 
incentive to cheat (and earn more money) with the co-
operative result.  
Isolated Negotiations: Water Quality 
The Kura River is polluted in the industrial part of east-
ern Georgia from industrial and domestic untreated 
waste. Much of the nation is served by wastewater 
treatment plants that were installed during the Soviet 
era. Many of those plants do not work, or only provide 
basic treatment. Given the high dependence of Azer-
baijan on Georgia for water resources, water pollution 
problems in Azerbaijan are primarily the result of up-
stream agricultural and industrial activity combined  
FIGURE 1. The Kura-Araks Basin in the Caucasian countries.  
Source: Vener and Campana (2010), the basin is enclosed in blue line. 
with poor treatment facilities. Construction of water filter 
treatment plants would improve water quality in both 
Georgia and in Azerbaijan, leading to health benefits. Diar-
rhea is one of the main diseases caused by contaminated 
water. The death rate of diarrheal diseases in 2008 was 9.5 
and 3 per 100,000 people for Azerbaijan and Georgia, re-
spectively. In contrast, death rates in some countries with 
high quality water are the following: USA 1.2, Canada 1.6, 
Netherlands 0.5, France 0.9, Germany 0.6, Sweden 0.5, and 
Norway 2. If Georgia builds or renovates the treatment fa-
cilities, water pollution will decrease and diseases caused by 
contaminated water will decrease as well.  
In contrast to the water quantity game, where the upstream 
country (Georgia) incurs the cost in order to benefit the 
downstream country (Azerbaijan), improving water quality 
in Georgia provides benefits in both countries. But, it is un-
realistic for Georgia to make the costly investment in water 
treatment on its own. Georgia has fewer economic re-
sources to pay for improving treatment facilities. In 2016, 
per-capita GDP in Azerbaijan and Georgia were $17,400 
and $10,000, respectively. In addition, the rate of water-
borne disease is higher in Azerbaijan; thus, it suffers more 
from the polluted water than Georgia does. Finally, poor 
water quality and poorly maintained treatment facilities 
have been common in Georgia for years, and politicians 
have not yet responded to the pollution. Thus, Azerbaijan 
must provide some additional benefit to Georgia for im-
proving water quality. As a significant exporter of natural 
gas, Azerbaijan can provide a discount on a portion of 
Georgia’s natural gas imports.  
Azerbaijan has two strategies: to provide natural gas to 
Georgia for a reduced price or not: cheaper gas or no cheap-
er gas. Georgia used to buy gas from Russia, but since 2006 
has purchased Azerbaijani gas diversifying its importers. In 
2016, Georgia imported approximately 90 percent of its nat-
ural gas from Azerbaijan and only about 10 percent from 
Russia. The strategy cheaper gas means selling natural gas at 
a discount relative to current prices. Georgia has two strate-
gies: to invest in pollution reduction technology to provide 
cleaner water to Azerbaijan or not: clean water or not clean 
water. It is costly to clean water, since water is heavily pollut-
ed from industrial, municipal, and agricultural uses. This 
game is presented in Table 1. The cell with the strategies no 
cheaper gas and no clean water is the status quo situation.  
Issue Linkage and the Interconnected Games: The inter-
connected game is presented in Table 2. With the intercon-
nected game, each country has four possible strategies. The 
countries can choose to cooperate on both issues, not to 
cooperate on both issues, or to cooperate on only one issue. 
The first number in the cell represents a payoff for Azerbai-
jan as a result of Azerbaijan’s and Georgian’s strategies. For 
example, the payoff in the first upper cell is (17.01, 1.505). 
This outcome, which is the fully cooperative one, corres- 
ponds to Azerbaijan choosing technology and Georgia 
choosing more water in the water quantity game, with 
the result being (15.215, 1.04) payoff, and Azerbaijan 
choosing cheaper gas and Georgia choosing clean wa-
ter in the water quality game, with the result being 
(1.795, 0.465) payoff. The payoff in the cell corre-
sponding to the third row and fourth column is (-
0.325, 4.28). This payoff corresponds to Azerbaijan 
choosing technology and Georgia choosing less water 
in the water quantity game, and Azerbaijan choosing 
no cheaper gas and Georgia choosing no clean water in 
water quality game with the result being (0, 0) non-
cooperative outcome.  
Results: Our results show that interconnected games 
are welfare improving because they ensure that the 
cooperative outcome is incentive compatible (i.e., 
achievable). Intuitively, this result occurs because one 
country has a highly dominant strategy in one game, 
while the other has a highly dominant strategy in the 
other. Since each game requires a fixed investment as a 
strategy for one country, and a repeated benefit for the 
other country, full cooperation is not achievable in 
either independent game, since each country has an 
incentive to cheat in one game. Thus, while linking 
issues does not expand the set of economic outcomes, 
it assures that each country has the fully cooperative 
outcome instead of the status quo (no agreement). The 
political feasibility of our results, which is crucial to 
policymakers who may want to use these issues as a 
starting point for negotiations, are reasonable in com-
parison to each nation’s economy. The estimated val-
ues show a greater gain to Azerbaijan from coopera-
tion than to Georgia ($17.01 billion versus $1.51 bil-
lion). However, these values are much closer when 
examined relative to each country’s GDP. Since Geor-
gia’s GDP is approximately one-fifth of Azerbaijan’s 
GDP, these values represent about 20 and 9 percent of 
GDP for Azerbaijan and Georgia, respectively. Since 
the payoffs are calculated as the net present value of a 
stream of future benefits, the annual benefit as a per-
cent of GDP is lower (about 1 to 2 percent). Thus, the 
results are reasonable, since the benefits are large 
enough to be of relevance to national policymakers, 
but not so large to be unrealistic. This information can 
be useful for policymakers when considering potential 
negotiation on transboundary waters between the 
countries, without the use of direct financial transfers.  
 
    Georgia (upstream) 
Azerbaijan 
(downstream) 
  Parameter Values (Billions of Dollars) 
Water Quantity Strategies More water Less water 
Technology 15.22 1.04 -0.33 4.28 
No technology 15.54 -3.24 0 0 
Water Quality Strategies Clean water No clean water 
Cheaper gas 1.80 0.47 -0.30 0.30 
  No cheaper gas 2.10 0.17 0 0 
    Georgia (upstream) 
Azerbaijan 
(downstream) 
  Parameter Values (Billions of Dollars) 
Strategies 
More water 
Clean water 
Less water 
Clean water 
More water 
No clean water 
Less water 
No clean water 
Technology 
Cheaper gas 17.01 1.51 1.47 4.75 14.92 1.34 -0.63 4.58 
No Technology 17.34 -2.78 1.80 0.47 15.24 -2.94 -0.30 0.30 
Technology 17.31 1.21 1.77 4.45 15.22 1.04 -0.33 4.28 
No technology 17.64 -3.08 2.10 0.17 15.54 -3.24 0.00 0.00 
TABLE 1. Payoffs in Isolated Negotiations between Azerbaijan and Georgia: Parameter Values   
Note: Parameter values are based on secondary data about the value of water consumption, the cost of improved irriga-
tion technology, the value of health impacts from poor water quality, water treatment costs, and the use of natural gas in 
Azerbaijan and Georgia  
TABLE 2. Interconnected game for water quantity and water quality between Azerbaijan and Georgia: Parameter 
Values. 
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